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Significant Steps or Empty Rhetoric? 
Current Efforts by the United States to Combat 
Sexual Trafficking near Military Bases 
Brian Parsons* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
“The policy of the United States is to attack vigorously the worldwide 
problem of trafficking in persons, using law enforcement efforts, 
diplomacy, and all other appropriate tools.”  
– National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD-22) dated December 16, 
2002 
“It is the policy of the Department of Defense that trafficking in persons 
will not be facilitated in any way by the activities of our Service members, 
civilian employees, indirect hires, or DoD contract personnel.”  
– Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz Memorandum dated 
January 30, 2004 
“No leader in this department should turn a blind eye to this issue.”  
– Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld Memorandum dated September 
16, 2004 
¶1 Trafficking in persons has emerged as one of the most serious problems facing the 
world today.  Somewhere between 600,000 and 800,000 people are trafficked each year 
across international borders.1  Most of the people trafficked are women and children and 
these numbers do not reflect the millions of people who are trafficked within their own 
countries.2  Sex trafficking often takes hold in poverty-stricken countries where there are 
 
 * J.D. Candidate, 2006, Northwestern University School of Law; B.A. in Communication, 2002, Saint 
Louis University.  I would like to thank Professor Douglas Cassel, Maureen T. Walsh, Sarah Mendelson, 
and LCDR Jim Carsten for all of the insight and advice they provided to me during the writing of this 
article.  I would particularly like to thank my wife, Joey, for all of her advice, criticism, love, and most of 
all patience. 
1 U.S. DEPT . OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 6 (June 2005), available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/47255.pdf. 
2 Id. 
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few opportunities for women to advance coupled with inadequate laws to prosecute 
traffickers.3 
¶2 Historically, many of the victims of sex trafficking include women who are forced 
to work as prostitutes in areas surrounding military bases.4  Areas near U.S. military 
bases are no exception, as brothels and massage parlors spring up to meet demand.  In 
fact, the United States has consistently allowed and, in some cases, even implicitly 
encouraged the development of brothels near military bases to satisfy the sexual desires 
of Americans serving there.5  Recently, as the list of offenses alleged to have been 
committed at Abu Ghraib seemingly increases by the day, new reports indicate a possible 
prostitution ring involving members of military police units having sex with Iraqi 
prostitutes.6  These incidents undermine and contradict efforts of the United States to lead 
the world in the fight against human trafficking. 
¶3 In addition, creating a demand for trafficked women in the areas surrounding U.S. 
military bases may be making the jobs of servicemen more difficult.  Trafficking in 
persons is currently the third most profitable form of trafficking worldwide, accounting 
for 9.5 billion U.S. dollars of annual revenue for organized crime each year.7  When U.S. 
forces are stationed abroad, one of their primary purposes is to combat organized crime 
and help enforce the rule of law.  However, the money spent on prostitutes by servicemen 
near U.S. military bases often ends up in the hands of the criminals who are responsible 
for sexual trafficking. 8  By spending money on prostitutes, the servicemen are helping to 
finance the criminal elements they are supposed to be stopping.  In fact, these activities 
may actually be creating a new market for trafficked women and providing a more fertile 
ground for criminal activity.  These actions frustrate the very purpose of a military 
presence and in the end may do more harm than good. 
¶4 In essence, sex trafficking near military bases boils down to a supply and demand 
issue.  While initiatives such as the United Nations Protocol on Trafficking in Persons 
and the Trafficking Victims Prevention Act9 may be useful in persuading countries to 
combat trafficking within their own borders, the host country alone has the power to 
influence the supply of trafficked women available near military bases.  But no matter 
how hard a country attempts to limit the influx of trafficked women into their country, as 
long as U.S. military bases are creating a strong demand for prostitution and trafficked 
women, organized crime will find a way to meet that demand.  This is not a unique 
problem of the United States and its military.  As long as there have been armies and 
wars, there have been prostitutes near military bases to service the sexual demands of 
 
3 Susan Tiefenbrun, The Saga of Susannah A U.S. Remedy for Sex Trafficking in Women: The Victims of 
Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, 2002 UTAH L. REV. 107, 111 (2002). 
4 Isabelle Talleyrand, Comment, Military Prostitution: How the Authorities Worldwide Aid and Abet 
International Trafficking in Women, 27 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 151, 152 (2000). 
5 Id. at 154-56; Emily Nyen Chang, Comment, Engagement Abroad: Enlisted Men, U.S. Military Policy 
and the Sex Industry 15 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 621 (2001). 
6 Greg Miller, Alcohol Cited as Problem at Prison; Officials at Abu Ghraib tried to rein in the illicit 
behavior before abuse of inmates surfaced, L.A. TIMES, June 13, 2004, at A1. 
7 TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT , supra  note 1, at 13-14. 
8 Id.; Tiefenbrun, supra  note 3, at 136. 
9 These will be discussed infra Part II. 
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soldiers.10  But, while the United States pledges to combat trafficking worldwide, these 
actions threaten the credibility of the United States and help to fund organized crime.11 
¶5 In recent years, the United States has taken steps on the international stage to 
combat sexual trafficking.  In his address to the United Nations General Assembly in 
2003, President Bush called human trafficking “a special evil in the abuse and 
exploitation of the most innocent and vulnerable.”12  More recently, the United States co-
sponsored a new “zero-tolerance” policy towards trafficking activities that was adopted 
by the twenty-six allies of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and twenty 
additional states in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC).13  However, the 
activities of the U.S. military and civilian contractors near U.S. military bases that 
contribute to the problem of trafficking make overall U.S. efforts in this area seem 
somewhat hypocritical. 
¶6 To deal with this problem, on December 16, 2002, President Bush issued a national 
security presidential directive establishing a zero-tolerance policy towards United States 
involvement in trafficking activities abroad.14  On January 30, 2004, Deputy Defense 
Secretary Paul Wolfowitz issued a memo outlining the zero-tolerance policy for the 
Department of Defense.15  Additionally, on September 16, 2004, Defense Secretary 
Donald Rumsfeld issued a memo to augment the memo of Deputy Defense Secretary 
Wolfowitz, stating his commitment to taking “every step possible to combat Trafficking 
in Persons.”16  However, questions remain as to whether some of the actions taken by the 
U.S. government to combat trafficking live up to this aggressive rhetoric. 
¶7 This paper will examine the legal steps being taken by the United States to combat 
the sexual trafficking that tends to flourish near U.S. military bases.  Part II will discuss 
the history of the U.S. military and its complicit relationship with prostitution near its 
military bases.  This section will also explore international efforts to combat trafficking 
and will explain why these efforts are insufficient.  Finally, Part II will examine the 
 
10 Enforcing U.S. Policies Against Trafficking in Persons: How is the U.S. Military Doing?: Hearing 
Before the U.S. Comm’n on Security and Cooperation in Europe  and the House Armed Services Comm., 
108th Cong. 2 (2004) [hereinafter Hearings] (testimony of Rep. Christopher Smith, Chairman, U.S. 
Comm’n on Security and Cooperation in Europe), available at 
http://www.csce.gov/index.cfm?Fuseaction=UserGroups.Home&ContentRecord_id=287&ContentType=B
&UserGroup_id=69&Subaction=Hearings&CFID=18547223&CFTOKEN=84789441. 
11 TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT , supra  note 1, at 13-14; Tiefenbrun, supra  note 3, at 136. 
12 President’s Address to the United Nations General Assembly, 39 WEEKLY COMP . PRES. DOC. 1256, 
1259 (September 23, 2003). 
13 U.S., Norwegian Envoys to NATO Brief on Anti-Trafficking Policy; NATO, EPAC should take steps to 
implement zero tolerance policy, Burns says, FED. INFO. AND NEWS DISPATCH, July 9, 2004 [hereinafter 
NATO anti-trafficking policy]. 
14 Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, Trafficking in Persons National Security 
Presidential Directive (Feb. 25, 2003) [hereinafter Trafficking Press Release], 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030225.html; Hearings, supra  note 10, at 3 
(testimony of Rep. Christopher Smith, Chairman, U.S. Comm’n on Security and Cooperation in Europe); 
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, ASSESSMENT OF DOD EFFORTS TO 
COMBAT TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS: PHASE II – BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA AND KOSOVO 5 n.2 (2003) 
[hereinafter PHASE II REPORT ], available at http://www.dodig.osd.mil/fo/foia/HT-Phase_II.pdf. 
15 Memorandum from Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, to Secretaries of the Military 
Departments and the members of the Department of Defense (Jan. 30, 2004) [hereinafter Wolfowitz memo] 
(on file with author). 
16 Memorandum from Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, to Secretaries of the Military Departments 
and the members of the Department of Defense (Sept. 16, 2004) [hereinafter Rumsfeld memo] (on file with 
author). 
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recent events that led to the United States’ aggressive stance toward trafficking in general 
and, more specifically, sexual trafficking near military bases.  Part III will focus on two 
legal avenues proposed by the United States to combat sexual trafficking.  First, a recent 
change to the Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM) specifically prohibits the soliciting of 
prostitutes by all military personnel.17  Second, the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction 
Act of 2000 may allow civilian contractors that are involved in trafficking activities 
abroad to be prosecuted in the United States.18  Part IV will examine some of the 
weaknesses of these and other measures and offer suggestions on ways to combat sexual 
trafficking near military bases more effectively. 
II. HISTORY 
A. The Relationship Between the United States Military and Prostitution 
¶8 Some of the first documented cases of an ongoing U.S. military connection to 
prostitution occurred on bases near the Mexican border and in the Philippines in the early 
1900s.19  The primary concern of the military became the threat of soldiers contracting a 
venereal disease (VD) from the prostitutes.20  To protect against this, the military began 
to require that local prostitutes be inspected by military doctors every week or two.21  
Rather than attempt to end the practice altogether by prohibiting the activity, the military 
instead chose merely to screen the prostitutes for the servicemen to make sure that they 
were not carrying a disease. 
¶9 In the early to mid 1900s, however, some government officials began efforts to end 
the practice of prostitution near military bases.22  One of the main reasons for this was 
that venereal disease proved to be a severe problem for the military. 23  To combat the 
spread of disease, local governments and the military increased the policing of red- light 
districts.24  In addition, during World War I soldiers could be court-martialed or have 
their pay withheld if they contracted a VD as a result of visiting a prostitute.25  Combating 
prostitution once again came into focus around WWII.  For example, the House of 
 
17 Exec. Order No. 13,387, 70 Fed. Reg. 60,697, 60,701 (Oct. 18, 2005). 
18 Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261-3267 (2000); Glenn R. Schmitt, Closing 
the Gap in Criminal Jurisdiction Over Civilians Accompanying the Armed Forces Abroad – A First Person 
Account of the Creation of the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000 , 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 55, 
56 (2001). 
19 ALLAN M. BRANDT , NO MAGIC BULLET : A SOCIAL HISTORY OF VENEREAL DISEASE IN THE UNITED 
STATES SINCE 1880, 53-56 (1985); Saundra Pollock Sturdevant & Brenda Stolzfus, Disparate Threads of 
the Whole: An Interpretive Essay, in LET THE GOOD TIMES ROLL 300, 303 (1992). 
20 BRANDT , supra  note 19, at 54.  Even at the time, this was not a new phenomenon.  A legend in 
military circles tells a story of Napolean who was decorating a soldier for bravery and inquired about his 
health.  When asked whether he had ever contracted gonorrhea, the soldier said, “Yes sir; 100 times.”  
Napolean said, “Were you cured?”  And the soldier replied, “I was cured 99 times; every time but the first 
time.”  See To Prohibit Prostitution Within Reasonable Distance of Military and Naval Establishments: 
Hearing on H.R. 2475 Before the House Comm. on Military Affairs, 77th Cong. 16 (1941) [hereinafter 
Hearing on H.R. 2475] (statement of Hon. Fiorello H. LaGuardia, Mayor, New York City). 
21 BRANDT , supra  note 19, at 54, Sturdevent & Stolzfus, supra  note 19. 
22 BRANDT , supra  note 19, at 52. 
23 Id. at 36 (noting that in 1909 venereal disease accounted for over one-third of all days lost by Army 
personnel). 
24 Id. at 53-57. 
25 Nancy K. Ota, Flying Buttresses, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 693, 706 (2000). 
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Representatives he ld hearings in 1945 to discuss permanently extending an earlier act that 
prohibited prostitution in and around military and naval establishments.26  Even then, 
however, one of the main motivations for ending this practice was “maintaining the 
health of the young boys.”27 
¶10 Despite these and other efforts, the assumption that men “required the sexual use of 
women’s bodies” remained, and by the time of the Vietnam War the military for the most 
part relented in order to “keep the troops contented and satisfied.”28  For example, the 
United States began stationing troops in Korea in 1955, and during the next forty years 
over one million Korean women served as sex providers for the U.S. military. 29  During 
this time, the United States also signed “Rest and Relaxation” (R&R) agreements with 
the Philippines and Thailand.30  Pursuant to these agreements, the governments of these 
countries were obligated to provide R&R centers, commonly known as Intoxication and 
Intercourse by the troops, for U.S. military personnel.31 
¶11 Many of these practices have continued to the present day.  In 1997, a sting 
operation uncovered a prostitution ring operating in Texas near a military base.32  Recent 
reports indicate that U.S. soldiers near Abu Ghraib solicited sex from Iraqi prostitutes.33  
Nearly every military base both at home and abroad is surrounded by a thriving sex 
industry. 34  Although the military generally does not take on as active of a role in 
providing military doctors to check prostitutes, it often expects that the host country will 
monitor them.35  However, U.S. Army officials in Korea are continuing to check the 
health records, including AIDS test results, of night club workers who work near U.S. 
military bases.36  These foreign entertainers are required to complete health exams every 
three months, and the entertainers feel that these practices run counter to the army’s 
campaign against human trafficking and prostitution. 37  If certain establishments have 
prostitutes with known sexually transmitted diseases, the military will place them off 
limits for both military personnel and civilians at the base.38  Overall, there exists an 
extensive problem of both patronization of brothels by servicemen and indirect control of 
brothel management by military officials.39 
 
26 Hearing on H.R. 2475, supra  note 20. 
27 Id. at 5. 
28 SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE 93-94 (1975). 
29 KATHARINE H.S. MOON, SEX AMONG ALLIES: MILITARY PROSTITUTION IN U.S.-KOREA RELATIONS 1 
(1997). 
30 RITA NAKASHIMA BROCK & SUSAN BROOKS THISTLEWAITE, CASTING STONES: PROSTITUTION AND 
LIBERATION IN ASIA AND THE UNITED STATES 5, 116-118 (1996). 
31 Id. at 5. 
32 Texas Prostitution Sting Snags War Games Troops, N.Y. TIMES, April 22, 1997. 
33 Miller, supra note 6. 
34 See Chang, supra note 5, at 631. 
35 Id. at 632. 
36 Seth Robinson, Examination of S. Korean Nightclub Workers’ Health Records Stirs Debate, STARS 
AND STRIPES, Nov. 28, 2004, 
http://www.estripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=24839&archive=true. 
37 Id. 
38 Chang, supra note 5, at 632. 
39 Id. at 621; Talleyrand, supra  note 4. 
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B. International Efforts and Their Inadequacies 
¶12 Although the international community has taken steps to combat trafficking, these 
efforts have had little success in curbing the practice near military bases.  One of the 
biggest steps began in 1998, when the United Nations General Assembly established a 
committee to negotiate an international convention against transnational organized 
crime.40  After two years of work, the General Assembly adopted the UN Convention 
Against Transnational Organized Crime along with two additional optional protocols.41  
One of the optional protocols was the U.N. Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish 
Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children. 42  One hundred twenty-five 
states signed the convention when it was opened for signature and eighty-one states 
additionally signed the supplemental protocol on trafficking in persons.43  The optional 
protocol on trafficking in persons officially went into force on December 25, 2003; to 
date, 117 states are signatories and ninety-five have ratified the protocol.44  The protocol 
defines “trafficking in persons” as: 
the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, 
by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of 
abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of 
vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to 
achieve the consent of a person having control of another person, for the 
purpose of exploitation.  Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the 
exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual 
exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to 
slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.45 
¶13 As a ratifying member of the protocol, member states are required to comply with a 
number of responsibilities.  For example, member states are required to enact legislative 
measures that criminalize acts of trafficking as defined in the statute,46 provide assistance 
and protection to victims of trafficking in persons,47 and set up programs to aid in the 
prevention of trafficking, 48 including training sessions for law enforcement and other 
 
40 G.A. Res. 111, U.N. GAOR 3rd Comm., 53rd Sess., 85th plen. mtg., Agenda Item 101, U.N. Doc. 
A/53/PV.85 (1998); Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 95 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 387, 407 (Sean D. Murphy ed., 2001) [hereinafter Murphy]. 
41 GA Res. 25, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., Agenda Item 105, U.N. Doc. A/55/383 (2000); Murphy, supra  
note 40. 
42 GA Res. 25, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., Annex II, Agenda Item 105, at 31, U.N. Doc. A/55/383 (2000) 
[hereinafter Protocol on Trafficking], available at 
http://www.uncjin.org/Documents/Conventions/dcatoc/final_documents_2/convention_%20traff_eng.pdf. 
43 Murphy, supra  note 40, at 407-08. 
44 The protocol went into force in accordance with article 17, which provided it go into effect 90 days 
after the fourtieth state had ratified it.  See 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/crime_cicp_signatures_trafficking.html [hereinafter Signatories] (last 
visited Jan. 14, 2006). 
45 Protocol on Trafficking, supra  note 42, at 2, Article 3(a). 
46 Id. at 3, Article 5. 
47 Id., Article 6. 
48 Id. at 5, Article 9. 
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relevant officials.49  Some of the countries in which the United States has a military 
presence, such as South Korea, are merely signatories to the protocol and have not yet 
ratified it.50  However, many countries in which the U.S. has a military presence, such as 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, have signed and ratified the protocol.51  Bosnia is a prime 
example of an area where the conditions of the optional protocol on trafficking in persons 
are in dire need of implementation, as a recent study showed that 90 percent of people 
from whom sexual services are purchased in Bosnia are victims of trafficking.52  A 2002 
report on the region showed that the Bosnian government failed to make serious efforts to 
enforce laws that criminalize trafficking or enact measures to support victims of 
trafficking.53 
¶14 In addition, authorities in places like Bosnia and Herzegovina may encounter 
difficulties implementing all of the conditions of the protocol due to the questionable 
status of foreign peacekeepers serving there.  In general, U.S. bases in foreign countries 
and the personnel stationed there are governed by Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA).54  
SOFA’s are bilateral agreements between sovereign nations that cover topics such as how 
to deal with U.S. personnel who commit crimes in host countries.55  U.S. forces serving in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina are serving as NATO forces and are governed by the SOFA of 
the Dayton Peace Accords.56  While all forces enjoy functional immunity for acts 
committed while carrying out their official duties under the Dayton Peace Accords, only 
military personnel are under the exclusive jurisdiction of their respective nations.57  
Civilian contractors, on the other hand, are open to prosecution by host countries for any 
other crimes committed in that country, including criminal activities involving 
trafficking.58 
¶15 Unfortunately, the Bosnian government has continually granted civilian contractors 
the same status as military personnel and refused to prosecute them under any 
circumstances because of a supposed lack of jurisdiction. 59  The chief of police of a 
village near a peacekeeping establishment expressed his frustration when he said, “We 
couldn’t bring charges. . .under Annex IA of [the Dayton Agreement]. . .When we find a 
foreigner is involved, this is the biggest problem for us. We can’t do anything against 
them - they are above the law.”60  Even when the host country does assert that it retains 
jurisdiction to prosecute these civilians, the country often lacks either the resources or the 
 
49 Id. at 6, Article 10. 
50 Signatories, supra  note 44. 
51 Id. 
52 NATO anti-trafficking policy, supra  note 13. 
53 Martina E. Vandenberg, Hopes Betrayed: Trafficking of Women and Girls to Post-Conflict Bosnia 
and Herzegovina for Forced Prostitution , 14 HUM. RTS. WATCH NO. 9 (D) 1, 21-22 (2002), 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/bosnia/Bosnia1102.pdf. 
54 Gwyn Kirk & Carolyn Bowen Francis, Redefining Security: Women Challenge U.S. Military Policy 
and Practice in East Asia, 15 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 229, 250 (2000). 
55 Id. 
56 Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina-Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina: Dayton Agreement on 
Implementing the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Nov. 21, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 170 (1996), available 
at http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/bosnia/bosagree.html; PHASE II REPORT , supra  note 14, at 14. 
57 Vandenberg, supra  note 53, at 46-47. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 47-48. 
60 Hearings, supra  note 10, at 126 (prepared statement of Martina E. Vandenberg, Attorney, Jenner & 
Block). 
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political will to do so.61 Additionally, when investigations do occur, contract employees 
are typically repatriated almost immediately to the United States to avoid testifying and 
facing criminal charges.62 
¶16 As long as countries that have ratified the UN protocol on trafficking in persons 
actually fulfill their obligations under it, the protocol should have a dramatic impact on 
trafficking overall.  Criminalizing trafficking, protecting the victims, and educating law 
enforcement will work to limit the supply of trafficked women near U.S. military bases.  
However, as is the case in Bosnia and Herzegovina, efforts to comply with the protocol 
face an uphill battle.  Additionally, problems remain with regard to both the legal status 
of military personnel and civilian contractors and the lack of political will to prosecute 
Americans.  In any event, international efforts in this area are just one part of dealing 
with the problem of trafficking.  To successfully combat trafficking near military bases, 
the U.S. must somehow deal with the fact that their military bases create a huge demand 
for trafficked women.  Until this demand is extinguished or at least lessened 
considerably, there will continue to be an influx of trafficked women to the areas 
surrounding U.S. military bases. 
C. Recent domestic developments in the fight against trafficking 
¶17 In the fall of 2000, Congress overwhelmingly voted in favor of legislation to 
toughen laws against trafficking in persons.63  On October 28, President Clinton signed 
into law the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) of 2000.64  The Act defines sex 
trafficking as “the recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision, or obtaining of a 
person for the purpose of a commercial sex act.”65  The purposes of the Act are to 
“combat trafficking in persons, a contemporary manifestation of slavery whose victims 
are predominantly women and children, to ensure just and effective punishment of 
traffickers, and to protect their victims.”66  Generally, the Act aims to fulfill these 
purposes in much the same way as the optional protocol on trafficking in persons, 
through the “three P’s” of prevention, protection, and prosecution. 67  The Act aims to 
prevent trafficking by encouraging international cooperation and by imposing economic 
sanctions on countries that fail to meet its minimum criteria.68  The Act also aims to 
protect victims of trafficking who assist authorities in prosecuting traffickers by allowing 
them to be eligible for temporary residency in the United States.69  Finally, the Act 
attempts to prosecute traffickers by imposing harsher sentences under new criminal 
charges.70 
 
61 Vandenberg, supra  note 53, at 46; P.W. Singer, War, Profits and the Vacuum of Law: Privatized 
Military Firms and International Law, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT ’L L. 521, 535 (2004). 
62 PHASE II REPORT , supra  note 14, at 22. 
63 371 to 1 in the House, 95 to 0 in the Senate. 146 CONG. REC. H9047-48 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 2000); 146 
CONG. REC. S10228 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 2000). 
64 Trafficking Victims Protection Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7110 (2000). 
65 22 U.S.C. § 7102. 
66 22 U.S.C. § 7101. 
67 TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT , supra  note 1, at 5; Kara C. Ryf, Comment, The First Modern Anti-
Slavery Act: The Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 , 34 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 45, 53 (2002). 
68 22 U.S.C. § 7104. 
69 22 U.S.C. § 7105. 
70 22 U.S.C. § 7109. 
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¶18 The responsibility for carrying out many of these new policies falls on a new 
Interagency Task Force required by the Act.71  The task force is chaired by the Secretary 
of State and is created to “monitor and combat trafficking.”72  Among its many 
responsibilities, the Act requires the task force to measure foreign government efforts to 
end severe forms of trafficking that occur within their countries.73  The results of this 
research are published by the State Department in an annual Trafficking in Persons 
Report.74  This report details the efforts of foreign countries to combat trafficking and 
assigns them to one of three tiers based on their level of compliance with the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking in persons.75  This information is then used to 
help determine if countries will be subject to the non-humanitarian, non-trade-related 
economic sanctions that may be implemented against any country with a poor record of 
compliance.76 
¶19 After the passage of the Act, stories began to circulate that caused the United States 
to turn a more watchful eye to the possible trafficking activities that were being 
perpetrated by their own military personnel abroad.  For example, in an investigation 
from 1999-2001, Human Rights Watch found evidence of widespread trafficking in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina.77  Particularly disturbing was the fact that members of the 
United Nations International Police Task Force engaged in trafficking activities 
themselves.78  Since they enjoy immunity from prosecution under the Dayton Peace 
Agreement, the only sanctions U.N. officials could bring against them were removal from 
service and repatria tion. 79  In addition, there were at least eight cases of U.S. contractors 
who allegedly purchased trafficked women to work as their personal servants.80  Human 
Rights Watch discovered that none of the contractors faced any criminal penalties upon 
returning to the United States.81 
¶20 In the spring of 2002, Fox News reporter Tom Merriman of Ohio aired a segment 
on the activities of U.S. servicemen in South Korea.82  The broadcast showed scenes 
taken by a hidden camera in which servicemen from the base were socializing with 
women in bars while military courtesy patrols stood watch nearby. 83  Most of the women 
were Filipino or Russian women who had been lured there by the promise of good jobs, 
but instead were forced to work as bar hosts and prostitutes.84  The tapes helped to bring 
to light the key role that servicemen played in the trafficking of women to South Korea.  
As political scientist Katharine Moon explains, servicemen “are the demand and women 
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are the supply.”85  This not uncommon situation demonstrated that U.S. military bases 
create a large demand for prostitutes and trafficked women throughout the world. 
¶21 These revelations sparked a wave of actions by various representatives of the U.S. 
government.  Twelve members of Congress, led by U.S. Representative Christopher 
Smith, called for an investigation by the Inspector General of the Department of Defense 
to look into the allegations by Fox News regarding South Korea.86  Additionally, on 
February 13, 2002, President Bush signed Executive Order 13257, which established the 
Cabinet- level Interagency Task Force to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons that 
was specified in the TVPA. 87  President Bush next issued a national security presidential 
directive, NSPD-22, which established a “zero-tolerance” policy for U.S. government 
employees and contracted personnel representing the U.S. abroad who engage in 
trafficking activities.88  NSPD-22 specifically states that the “policy of the United States 
is to attack vigorously the worldwide problem of trafficking in persons, using law 
enforcement efforts, diplomacy, and all other appropriate tools.”89  NSPD-22 also directs 
all relevant federal agencies to “strengthen their collective efforts, capabilities, and 
coordination to support the policy to combat trafficking in persons.”90  Finally, the 
Directive states that “our policy is based on an abolitionist approach to trafficking in 
persons, and our efforts must involve a comprehensive attack on such trafficking, which 
is a modern day form of slavery.”91 
¶22 In 2003, the Department of Defense Inspector General released two reports that 
documented its investigations of Korea and Bosnia and Herzegovina that had been called 
for by Rep. Smith.  These reports verified some of the earlier stories about military 
personnel engaging in activities that promoted and facilitated trafficking activities near 
U.S. bases, but also trumpeted the steps that had been taken to stop these activities and 
even announced that United States Forces Korea (USFK) “has set the example for other 
overseas commanders who may encounter the impact of human trafficking.”92  On July 
10, 2003, the Inspector General released the first report, “Assessment of DoD Efforts to 
Combat Trafficking in Persons, Phase 1 – United States Forces Korea.”93  One of the 
main prongs of their assessment examined the demand side of trafficking through “the 
adequacy of ongoing programs sponsored by USFK to curb Service member use of off-
base establishments that may traffic in persons.”94  Efforts to reduce Service member 
demand in this area focused on: “(1) educating Service members on national policy 
regarding human trafficking, on the requirement for exemplary conduct by all Service 
members, and on the illegality of prostitution under Korean law and USFK regulations, 
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and (2) improving on-base recreational facilities so those facilities become viable 
alternatives to off-base entertainment attractions.”95  The Inspector General found that 
USFK had “embraced” their recommendations to bolster the educational efforts and that 
efforts to improve on-base recreational activities were “sufficient.”96 
¶23 On December 8, 2003 the Inspector General released the second part of the report 
entitled “Assessment of DoD Efforts to Combat Trafficking in Persons, Phase II – 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo”.97  The Inspector General again reported “generally 
favorable findings” on the actions of U.S. Service members, but admitted that they 
contributed to the human trafficking problem “at some, undefined level.”98  In addition, 
there was also evidence of “some level of DoD contractor involvement” in trafficking 
activities.99  One of the recommendations made by the report called on the Department of 
Defense to establish a policy on human trafficking that encourages commanders to: 
1. educate service members on human trafficking issues, 
2. increase law enforcement efforts as needed to place offending 
entertainment establishments off limits, 
3. incorporate anti-human trafficking provisions in overseas contracts, and 
4. examine human trafficking matters as part of established IG inspection 
activities.100 
¶24 As these reports by the Department of Defense came out, tough talk by the United 
States continued.  On September 23, 2003, President Bush called on the United Nations 
General Assembly to “show new energy in fighting back an old evil.”101  Later that year, 
the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003 was signed into law. 102  
Among other things, the Act created a “Special Watch List” of Tier 2 countries that 
should receive special scrutiny in addition to a requirement that countries provide data on 
trafficking-related activities in order to be considered for Tier 1 status.103 
¶25 Only months later, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz issued a 
memorandum implementing the President’s new zero-tolerance policy throughout the 
Department of Defense.104  This memo echoed the four main objectives that had been 
called for by the Inspector General to help the Department of Defense combat trafficking 
in persons.  In summary, these objectives stated the need to: 
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1. educate Service members and civilians about trafficking and the 
expectations of their actions in regard to it 
2. deny access to establishments involved in trafficking activities 
3. incorporate provisions that impose penalties on contractor employees 
who participate in trafficking activities 
4. evaluate efforts to combat trafficking with the Inspector General. 105 
Finally, on September 16, 2004, Secretary Rumsfeld issued a statement reiterating the 
commitment to the zero-tolerance policy outlined by the Deputy Secretary of Defense 
and calling on the leaders in the department to never “turn a blind eye to this issue.”106 
¶26 Amidst all of the strongly-worded statements by the government, the question begs 
to be asked: What steps is the government taking to implement the objectives of the 
Department of Defense?  And as the proliferation of sex trafficking near United States 
military bases continues to be a black eye on the legitimacy of our efforts to combat 
trafficking worldwide, what initiatives are being carried out to stop these trafficking 
activities by U.S. citizens? 
III. CURRENT LEGAL EFFORTS 
¶27 As is evidenced by the stories in South Korea and in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in 
order to combat trafficking near U.S. military bases the actions of both military 
servicemen and civilian contractors must be dealt with.  Legally, the United States 
military members are governed by the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).  
Unfortunately, the legal status of the civilian contractors who work alongside servicemen 
is not as clearly defined. 
A. The Uniform Code of Military Justice 
¶28 All servicemen in the United States military are subject to the rules and regulations 
of the UCMJ.  The UCMJ is enacted by Congress and is essentially a complete set of 
criminal laws.107  The UCMJ is implemented through Executive Orders of the President 
which form a comprehensive set of laws known as the Manual for Courts-Martial 
(MCM).108  On the subject of prostitution, the Manual for Courts-Martial until recently 
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(a) That the accused had sexual intercourse with another person not the 
accused’s spouse; 
(b) That the accused did so for the purpose of receiving money or other 
compensation 
(2) Pandering by compelling, inducing, enticing, or procuring act of 
prostitution. 
(a) That the accused compelled, induced, enticed, or procured a certain 
person to engage in an act of sexual intercourse for hire and reward with a 
person to be directed to said person by the accused. 
(3) Pandering by arranging or receiving consideration for arranging for 
sexual intercourse or sodomy. 
(a) That the accused arranged for, or received valuable consideration for 
arranging for, a certain person to engage in sexual intercourse or sodomy 
with another person. 109 
¶29 Military personnel can also be prosecuted for soliciting or patronizing a prostitute 
under the General Article of 134 of the UCMJ.110  Article 134 allows the military to 
prosecute servicemen and women for acts that are not specifically enumerated in either 
the UCMJ or MCM.111  In part, Article 134 provides that all disorders that are “to the 
prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces” or are “conduct of a nature to 
bring discredit upon the armed forces” are to be punished by the discretion of the court 
according to the “nature and degree of the offense.”112 
¶30 In United States v. Miller, the Court considered whether soliciting a prostitute in 
fact fell within the MCM under the purview of pandering, which would incur the stiffer 
penalties of section (2).113  The government argued that the wording of paragraph 
97b(2)(a) uses only the term “a person” to describe the individual with whom the 
prostitute has sexual intercourse.114  However, paragraph 97b(3)(a) specifically uses the 
term “another person” to identify the same relationship.115  Since section (2) did not 
specifically require that the sexual intercourse be directed to “another person” the 
government contended that a serviceman who solicited a prostitute to have sex with him 
would fall within the definition.  The Court disagreed and ruled that the ambiguity of 
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section (2) required them to rule in favor of the appellant and agreed that the crime of 
pandering required a third party. 116 
¶31 However, the Court upheld the appellant’s conviction for solicitation.  The lower 
court found that Miller’s actions violated the General Article of 134 under the UCMJ 
because “asking others to engage in sex for compensation is prejudicial to good order and 
discipline or of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces.”117  Therefore, although 
soliciting a prostitute was not found to be a punishable offense under the MCM, it would 
still seem that no further action would be required by the government since the act of 
soliciting a prostitute has been deemed to be covered under Article 134 of the UCMJ.    
¶32 In the Inspector General’s report for the Department of Defense, the Inspector 
General stated that the investigation “found potential weaknesses on the part of U.S. 
military leadership in the Balkans in addressing human trafficking issues . . . . There are 
no specific prohibitions on patronizing prostitutes or engaging in other activities that may 
directly support human trafficking.”118  Additionally, the report stated that “[b]ecause 
there is no military standard that directly addresses patronization of prostitutes and other 
activities associated with human trafficking, criminal prosecution of these activities under 
military law is rendered more difficult.”119  In light of these findings, against the backdrop 
of a tradition of allowing and even encouraging the solicitation of prostitutes by military 
personnel, and with the knowledge that the decision in Miller left few if any alternatives, 
the government proposed changes to the MCM making soliciting a prostitute a specific 
offense.  Although the Department of Defense realized that this activity remained 
chargeable under Article 134 of the UCMJ, as Principal Deputy Undersecretary of 
Defense Charles Abell testified, the Department hoped that “this change will make the 
offense visible, observable.  It will raise command attention, and it will make it more 
visible to the Service member who might be tempted.”120 
¶33 In response to these needs, the Department of Defense proposed to insert the 
following language in the Manual for Court-Martial: 
(2) Patronizing a Prostitute 
(a) That the accused had sexual intercourse with another person not the 
accused’s spouse; 
(b) That the accused compelled, induced, enticed, or procured such person 
to engage in acts of sexual intercourse in exchange for money or other 
compensation. 121 
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These proposed changes were adopted by Executive Order 13,387 on October 18, 
2005.122  It is still too early to tell what impact these recent changes will have on the 
conduct of servicemen. 
B. Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000 
¶34 Even if these changes significantly curb the solicitation of trafficked women by 
servicemen, the issue of how to deal with civilian contractors who reside at military bases 
and contribute to the problem of trafficking must also be addressed.  Civilians who 
accompany the military overseas are not subject to military jurisdiction, except during 
times of war.123  When civilians accompanying the Armed Forces overseas commit 
serious offenses and the host country fails to exercise jurisdiction, a “jurisdiction gap” is 
created where these civilians face no consequences for their actions.124  However, one law 
that could be used to prosecute civilian contractors involved in trafficking near military 
bases is the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000 (MEJA).125  This law 
expands the jurisdiction of the United States and has received national attention recently 
as a possible means of prosecuting civilian contractors who are involved in the abuse of 
Iraqi prisoners, such as those at Abu Ghraib.126 
¶35 Due to the lack of jurisdiction over civilians serving overseas and the fact that 
many foreign governments neglect to prosecute offenders, the unfortunate result is that 
people who commit crimes while accompanying the Armed Forces overseas often go 
unpunished.127  After many years of effort, Congress attempted to deal with this problem 
by enacting the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000.128  The MEJA extends 
federal jurisdiction to include citizens who accompany the U.S. Armed Forces abroad.129  
Specifically, the MEJA extends the jurisdiction of federal courts to cover felony level 
offenses (punishable by more than one year in prison) that would apply under federal law 
if the offense had occurred within the territories of the United States.130  The MEJA also 
continues to respect SOFAs in that it does not allow prosecution under the Act if a 
foreign government has prosecuted or is prosecuting the person. 131 
¶36 However, one of the major loopholes still existing after the passage of the MEJA is 
that it covers only a limited class of civilians.  Specifically, the MEJA permits 
prosecution of civilians “employed by or accompanying” American Armed Forces.132  On 
its face, the statute would appear to cover all civilian contractors who are “employed by” 
or “accompany” the Armed Forces abroad.  However, the definitions given by the statute 
limit the term “employed by” to include only civilian employees, contractors and 
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subcontractors employed by the Department of Defense.133  In addition, the term 
“accompanying” is limited to include only the dependents of members of the Armed 
Forces, civilian personnel and contractors.134  This limitation means that any civilian 
contractor working for another government agency such as the Department of State 
would be immune from prosecution. 135  Given its narrow scope, it appears unlikely that 
the MEJA will be able to end the contributions to trafficking by civilians accompanying 
the U.S. military abroad. 
¶37 There have been discussions about ways to fix this shortcoming of the MEJA.  For 
example, in May of 2004 a bill was introduced in the House of Representatives that 
would extend the jurisdiction of the MEJA. 136  Specifically, the amendment would 
expand the jurisdiction of the MEJA to cover civilian contractors who commit federal 
offenses “while supporting the mission of the Department of Defense overseas.”137  In 
theory, this would provide a broader scope to the law because contractors who work for 
the United States and support the mission of the Department of Defense would now be 
subject to prosecution under the MEJA.  However, at this point civilian contractors still 
enjoy almost unlimited immunity for their actions at U.S. military bases. 
IV.  WEAKNESSES OF THE PROPOSED CHANGES 
¶38 In its fight to combat human trafficking, the U.S. government has continually made 
aggressive statements about its commitment to stopping this international problem.  
Although actions have been taken to make soliciting a prostitute a specific chargeable 
offense for servicemen, more steps need to be taken to ensure that servicemen are not 
contributing to the demand-side of the problem of sexual trafficking.  Further, the scope 
of the MEJA is insufficient to effectively deal with the issue of civilian contractors who 
participate in trafficking activities.  Even an expansion of the scope of the MEJA to cover 
all contractors who engage in specific trafficking activities would do nothing to deal with 
contractors who create a demand for trafficked women by merely patronizing prostitutes.  
The following section will explore some of the weaknesses that need to be addressed to 
stop the flow of trafficked women to areas near military bases and will offer suggestions 
on how to deal with this problem more effectively in the future. 
A. Military 
¶39 In the Phase 1 report by the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the 
assessment examined two main programs implemented by the United States Forces 
Korea (USFK) to curb the use of off-base prostitution establishments that often have 
links to trafficking activities.  These programs focus on two areas: (1) “educating Service 
members” on the issues associated with human trafficking and the national policy 
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regarding it, and (2) improving recreational facilities so that they become “viable 
alternatives to off-base entertainment attractions.”138 
¶40 The U.S. has taken several steps to educate their service members about human 
trafficking.  For example, the Department of Defense has developed a core training 
module for all military and contractor personnel deployed overseas.139  The module will 
be used to educate Department of Defense members about the nature of trafficking, the 
Department’s policy on trafficking, and the provisions available to implement this 
policy. 140  The training will be available to all service members electronically through the 
Joint Knowledge Development and Distribution Capability System. 141  In addition, the 
actions of the USFK in this area may serve as a model for how to educate forces stationed 
at other military bases around the globe.  USFK has developed a human trafficking and 
prostitution core curriculum that begins within the very first week of in-processing at the 
base.142  This training continues during other collective and leadership training 
opportunities and is reinforced through the widespread dissemination of the Command’s 
zero-tolerance message through the newspaper, radio and television. 143 
¶41 Even as the U.S. attempts to educate the Service members about the detrimental 
effects of human trafficking, the general attitude that many servicemen hold towards 
prostitutes may be the most significant obstacle the U.S. will face.  The U.S. military has 
a long history of allowing and even encouraging soldiers serving abroad to patronize 
prostitutes.144  Now that the military has recognized that these activities often support 
sexual trafficking and help to undermine their mission, it has taken steps to stop this 
practice.  Encouraging reports out of Korea indicate that the United States has prosecuted 
nearly 400 U.S. Service members stationed in Korea for actions relating to prostitution 
during 2004 and more than 800 areas known for ties to prostitution have been designated 
as off- limits to soldiers.145  However, after allowing this activity to continue for so long, 
the military will likely encounter great difficulty changing a culture that has historically 
permitted soldiers to patronize prostitutes. 
¶42 For example, troops stationed in countries where prostitution is not illegal are 
already voicing their displeasure over the recent changes to the MCM.146  Some, such as 
Army Sgt. Adam Z. Pastor, who serves on a German base that is situated near a thriving 
red light district, expressed a belief that not all instances of prostitution are linked with 
sex trafficking when he stated that “[i]t would be different if it were some third-world 
country that had no jobs and no opportunity, and women were forced into it.”147  Even 
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some soldiers who do not visit prostitutes themselves assert that “[i]t’s none of [the 
military’s] business what soldiers do off base.  If a soldier wants to have sex with a 
prostitute and ruin his life that’s his problem, not the military’s.”148  Unfortunately, these 
opinions merely serve to highlight the lack of understanding by servicemen about the 
extent of the problem of human trafficking.  Although they may not think that any of 
these women were “forced into it,” the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe has reported that the majority of women “trafficked for the sex industry are 
trafficked to large cities, vacation and tourist areas, and areas near military bases in 
Europe.”149 
¶43 This attitude towards the act of patronizing a prostitute could also hinder 
enforcement of the proposed changes.  Military officers who have been consistently lax 
in cracking down on soldiers who solicit prostitutes will more than likely continue to do 
so.  Further, it may not be very likely that soldiers who are brought up on charges will 
face the maximum penalty of a dishonorable discharge.150  Military courts that require a 
two-thirds vote or greater for a court-martial likely would give great weight to whether 
the offense was committed in a country where prostitution is legal.151 
¶44 There is also evidence that the current organizational culture of the military may be 
responsible for a less than comprehensive effort to implement the zero-tolerance policy 
promulgated by the Department of Defense.  Department of Defense officials who 
worked closely with the reports on trafficking questioned the veracity of these reports, 
commenting that those responsible for the Phase 2 report would “wash this report; they 
are washing the Korea report.”152  Similarly disturbing is the methodology employed by 
the Inspector General investigators doing research for these reports.  For example, 
meetings on the bases would typically begin with closed-ended questions such as “Do 
you have any problems with trafficking here?”153  The person being interviewed would 
unsurprisingly answer that there was no trafficking problem, creating a situation in which 
evidence of trafficking would literally have to “fall in the laps” of the inspectors for them 
to have any chance of uncovering it.154  These problems highlight a large r cultural reality 
of the military, which makes strong statements about fighting trafficking while at the 
same time downplaying the significance of the problem. 
¶45 To combat this, the government should continue to follow the first objective laid 
out by the Department of Defense that expressed a desire to educate “all Service 
members and DoD civilians serving overseas on the worldwide trafficking menace.”155  
As it stands now, the practice of soliciting a prostitute has been so common for so long 
that aggressive attempts to stop solicitation likely will encounter strong resistance.  The 
best way to alleviate this resistance is to first thoroughly educate all members of the 
Armed Forces about the realities of human trafficking and to explain that their money is 
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funding criminal elements when they visit a prostitute.156  Current efforts, such as the 
training module that has been released by the Department of Defense, fail “to engage the 
audience with the kind of personal case studies or discussions that can shake callous 
attitudes toward prostitutes and inspire investigators to treat trafficking as the outrageous 
human rights violation that it is.”157  The efforts of the USFK may be able to be used as a 
model, as all Department of Defense personnel arriving in Korea receive training on the 
“harmful and dehumanizing practice of human trafficking and [the] policy of zero-
tolerance.”158  Only as these education programs continue to be implemented will a true 
policy of zero-tolerance be allowed to take hold in the military. 
¶46 In addition, pursuant to the recommendations of the Inspector General of the 
Department of Defense, the U.S. military has taken steps to not only educate its personnel 
on trafficking, but to furnish viable on-site alternatives to leaving the base and potentially 
visiting prostitutes.  Again, the USFK has attempted to set an example by supporting 
quality of life initiatives that make available various athletic, educational, spiritual, and 
recreational activities for the personnel.159  For example, these initiatives include 
“expanded evening and weekend education programs, free internet access for on- line 
education and e-university programs, installation-sponsored band concerts, late-night 
sports leagues and tournaments, expanded chaplains’ activities, and increased operating 
hours for athletic and dining facilities . . . .”160  While proposed in good faith, these 
measures sound somewhat akin to high school parents and faculty hosting a post-prom 
party to offer an alternative so that the students do not drink.  Where the overall demand 
for prostitutes creates a readily available supply to satisfy their sexual desires, the 
availability of pick-up basketball games and prayer services probably will not have much 
of an effect. 
B. Civilian Contractors 
¶47 Even if the government is able to get a handle on the servicemen who contribute to 
the spread of sexual trafficking, given the increasing number of civilians who work 
alongside the military it is imperative that steps be taken to cease their involvement in 
sexual trafficking as well.  The increase in the number of civilians who work with the 
military as private contractors has been necessitated by the fact that the U.S. military has 
shrunk from 2.1 million to 1.4 million active troops since the end of the Cold War.161  
Pentagon officials now say that they would not be able to carry on a war without the 
assistance of private contractors.162  In Iraq alone, U.S. authorities and independent 
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experts say that the war has created 20,000 military jobs for private contractors.163  In 
fact, the United States does not have an accurate total of how many civilian contractors it 
employs and has stationed around the world.164  In March 2002, then Secretary of the 
Army Thomas E. White issued a memo ordering the service to gather information on its 
contractor workforce, including the total number of contract workers on the payroll. 165  
Despite this order and the fact that this information would seemingly be important to 
know, Army officials indicate that as of 2004 no data had been collected.166 
¶48 Regardless of the actual number of civilian contractors, the Office of the Inspector 
General confirmed that contractors contribute to the trafficking problem in its 2003 
report, which stated that “DOD contractor employees may have more than a limited role 
in trafficking . . . .”167  Again, one of the main problems that will be encountered with 
civilian contractors will be enforcement.  In Bosnia, although there were several reports 
of U.S. contractors actually purchasing women as chattel, there was no indication that 
U.S. investigators even interviewed the trafficked victims.168  Instead of encouraging 
contractors who observed acts of trafficking to come forward with their stories, one 
contractor who reported that eight of his colleagues had purchased women in 1999 and 
2000 was fired.169  To date, not a single contractor has been prosecuted using the 
MEJA. 170  Recently, in a case that could potentially open the door to holding contractors 
accountable, the government did indict a CIA contractor for allegedly beating a prisoner 
to death with a flashlight in Afghanistan. 171  Still, there is little evidence that the 
government intends to back up its strong words by actually prosecuting civilians thought 
to be involved in acts of trafficking. 
¶49 Another problem is the limited jurisdiction that is available under the MEJA.  
Currently, only contractors who work for the Department of Defense can be prosecuted 
under MEJA. 172  Therefore, contractors working for any other U.S. department are 
immune from prosecution.  Even the proposed changes to the MEJA would do little to 
“close this jurisdictional gap” because the amended MEJA would still require a nexus to 
the Department of Defense to assert jurisdiction. 173  Further, since only one person has 
been prosecuted under the MEJA, a lot of uncertainty exists about how it should be used.  
The MEJA is a statute “that requires uniform implementation rules, and those still don’t 
exist.”174 The lack of regulations that accompanied the MEJA have in many ways left it 
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“dead on arrival.”175  After four years, the Department of Defense did finally propose 
regulations that would implement the MEJA. 176  However, Rep. David Price, the author 
of a proposed amendment to the MEJA, 177 admits that: “For all the good it’s done, MEJA 
may as well not exist.”178 
¶50 Finally, the third objective of the Department of Defense’s efforts to combat 
trafficking states that it will incorporate provisions into overseas service contracts that 
“prohibit any activities on the part of contractor employees that support or promote 
trafficking in persons.”179  Although it is required by NSPD-22 and the Trafficking 
Victims Protection Reauthorization Act, the Department of Defense has not changed its 
existing contracts to require that contractors not engage in trafficking. 180  Nor has it 
incorporated a new clause into the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulations Supplement 
that would at least incorporate it into future contracts.181  Without a threat of losing their 
contracts or any form of punishment, contractors lack any real motivation to hold their 
employees accountable. 
¶51 In fact, the failure of the United States to hold contractors accountable for their 
actions extends to the character of the personnel that are employed by these contractors.  
Many companies who serve as contractors for the United States have recruited former 
police officers and soldiers who themselves engaged in human rights violations from 
regimes “such as apartheid South Africa, Augusto Pinochet’s Chile, and Slobodan 
Milosevic’s Yugoslavia.”182  One Italian diplomat explains that “[e]veryone [] knows that 
hundreds of men wanted for crimes against humanity have left the country to take jobs 
[with U.S. contractors] in Iraq.”183  The lack of control the U.S. chooses to exercise over 
whom contractors hire and the actions their employees take while they serve contributes 
to more human right violations, whether it is prisoner abuse in Iraq or complicity with 
trafficking activities near U.S. military bases. 
¶52 Even if the United States is able to get a handle on the small percentage of 
contractors that actively engage in trafficking activities, it will do little to slow the influx 
of trafficked women to areas near military bases if contractors are still creating a large 
demand for prostitutes.  The MEJA only applies to offenses that are punishable by more 
than one year in prison, 184 and the act of soliciting a prostitute by a contractor is not a 
serious enough offense to invoke MEJA jurisdiction.  Only through implementing 
 
175 Id. 
176 Hearings, supra  note 10, at 55 (prepared statement of the Honorable Charles S. Abell, Principal 
Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness) (The proposed regulations would be a new 
Part 153 to title 32, Code of Federal Regulations. “On June 29, 2004, the Deputy Secretary of Defense 
forwarded the proposed regulations to the Chairmen and Ranking Members of the Senate and House 
Judiciary Committees for their statutory 90-day review opportunity before they can be implemented”). 
177 H.R. 4390, supra  note 136. 
178 Yeoman, supra  note 161. 
179 Wolfowitz memo, supra  note 15. 
180 Hearings, supra  note 10, at 129 (prepared statement of Martina E. Vandenberg, Attorney, Jenner & 
Block).  However, some Department of Defense contractors have had new clauses incorporated into their 
contracts.  For an example of a sample human trafficking and prostitution clause, see PHASE II REPORT , 
supra  note 14, Attachment B. 
181 Hearings, supra  note 10, at 129 (prepared statement of Martina E. Vandenberg, Attorney, Jenner & 
Block). 
182 Yeoman, supra  note 161. 
183 Id. 
184 Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3267 (2000). 
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS [ 2 0 0 6  
 
588 
provisions into overseas contracts which prohibit activities that promote trafficking will 
the Department of Defense be able to eliminate the high demand for trafficked women 
near its military bases. 
C. Recommendations 
¶53 Trafficking in persons continues to be a pervasive problem worldwide.  The 
majority of trafficking involves women and children used for sexual exploitation.  From 
the many memoranda and directives stating the United States’ strong stance against 
trafficking, it appears that, if nothing else, there is a growing awareness of the nature of 
the problem.  However, until the United States takes the necessary steps to stop the 
proliferation of sexual trafficking that occurs near its own military bases, such strong 
words will ring hollow to the world.  In the past, pressure has been applied on the 
military to stop the practice of patronizing prostitutes to avoid contracting diseases or for 
moral reasons.  However, these efforts were aimed at protecting U.S. soldiers rather than 
the victims of sexual trafficking.  Today, it is more important than ever to take practical 
steps to discourage the practice as most of the money that is made from the sex industry 
ends up in the hands of criminals and sometimes even possible terrorists.185  In fact, the 
sex trafficking industry is slowly overtaking drug trafficking as the industry of choice for 
international organized crime groups.186  The fact that these profits end up funding 
organized crime and terrorists undermines the purpose of the occupation. 
¶54 The United States must not only make efforts to help limit the supply of trafficked 
women; more importantly, it must seek to decrease the demand for prostitutes in the areas 
around military bases.  In order to stop military personnel from visiting prostitutes, they 
must first be thoroughly educated about the effects of sex trafficking.  This education 
must be vivid and personal.  The situations exposed must be relevant to the soldier’s 
current occupation.  Otherwise it will be close to impossible to effectively implement and 
enforce recent changes that would prohibit the solicitation of prostitutes under the MCM. 
¶55 The issue of civilian contractors poses a potentially even larger hurdle as the 
regulations related to contractors are weak or altogether nonexistent.  Civilian contractors 
continue to make up more and more of the U.S. workforce at military bases and the 
military is becoming increasingly dependent upon their services.  Currently, the MEJA is 
insufficient to prohibit contractors from engaging in trafficking activities, and the laws 
that are applicable are rarely enforced.  The U.S. needs to implement aggressive policies 
that will not only stop civilian contractors from engaging in trafficking activities, but will 
also prohibit them from soliciting a prostitute which contributes to the demand for sexual 
trafficking.  Otherwise, sex trafficking will continue to flourish near military bases to 
satisfy the demand for prostitutes from civilian contractors who face no threat of 
discipline for their actions. 
¶56 If the United States and the Department of Defense are committed to stopping the 
spread of sexual trafficking near military bases, they will have to go beyond previous 
efforts that have only begun to address this issue.  Thus far, legal efforts to control both 
soldiers and civilian contractors have been insufficient to stop the behavior that persists.  
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Stronger legal initiative must be coupled with an overall change in military culture.  The 
alternative of issuing bold statements against trafficking without taking any real action 
will allow the continued exploitation of women as slaves, destabilize regions already 
hostile to U.S. occupation, and sabotage U.S. efforts to lead the world in the fight against 
human trafficking. 
